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Optimism, pessimism and the gains from trade 
 
Section 1. Introduction 
Since the end of the 1970s, new models of choice under uncertainty have been developed 
which generalize the classic Expected Utility Theory of von Neumann-Morgensten. Among 
these, Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) theory, first proposed by Quiggin (1982), 
has been applied to a diverse range of topics, mainly concerning finance and insurance 
theory1. In this paper, we suggest a new application of RDEU theory in re-examining the 
gains from trade debate under uncertainty. 
At least since Brainard and Cooper (1968), international economists have been interested in 
the welfare impact of international trade in the presence of uncertainty. For instance, using the 
traditional expected utility framework, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Grossman (1984) and 
Shy (1988) describe an economy in which risk-averse managers have to choose between a 
certain project and a risky one. In this standard analysis of decision-making under risk, 
international trade depends crucially on the absence of hedging instruments (e.g. an insurance 
market). Under the assumption of complete markets, there is no international trade.  
The Dual Theory of choice under risk developed by Yaari (1987) is a special case of RDEU 
theory which reflects individuals’ “optimism” and “pessimism” with respect to probabilities. 
This Dual Theory has well-documented empirical foundations and important theoretical 
implications.  
As shown by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the linearity in probabilities assumed by the 
expected utility framework is inconsistent with empirical studies of human behaviour: people 
                                                 
1
 See Starmer (2000) for a survey. 
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seem to have different attitudes towards small probabilities and large probabilities. Rank 
Dependent Excepted Utility models like that of Yaari (1987) take this behaviour into account, 
as probabilities are distorted by individuals. In addition, the specific misperception of risk by 
entrepreneurs has been documented by Cooper, Woo and Dunkerberg (1988), who show that 
entrepreneurs in the United States are rather optimistic: 80% of American entrepreneurs 
foresee a probability of success of over 70%, whereas numerous studies suggest that less than 
50% of businesses survive for more than five years.  
The Dual Theory also has marked theoretical implications for Pareto allocations. According 
to Hammond (1981), “when managers misperceive probabilities bond markets also give them 
too much scope for bad decisions”. For instance, Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) show that (in 
the Dual Theory framework) it is not possible to reach an optimum with a perfect insurance 
market ex-post since some managers will choose not to insure themselves against risk. When 
decision making is modeled under RDEU, it does not matter whether markets are complete or 
not: the hedging of risk is imperfect. In the context of international trade under uncertainty 
when decision making is modelled under RDEU, we might expect that trade will still take 
place even when there are complete markets. This is an interesting implication of RDEU 
theory. 
Another motivation of this paper is to show that manager heterogeneity matters when 
considering the welfare effects of international trade under uncertainty. We extend Blanchard 
and Peltrault (2004) by introducing, in each country, a continuum of managers who are 
heterogeneous with respect to their degree of optimism over the probability of success. This 
heterogeneity assumption receives empirical support in Cooper et al. (1988): some 
entrepreneurs are pessimistic (e.g. 1% foresee a probability of success of 10%) while some 
are optimistic (e.g. 33% foresee a probability of success of 100%). Firm heterogeneity has 
become an important assumption in the international trade literature. In particular, a growing 
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number of papers have analysed how international trade can induce reallocations of resources 
among heterogeneous firms within an industry (Jean, 2002, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and 
Kortum, 2003, Melitz, 2003, Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2004, and Falvey, Greenaway and 
Yu, 2004). When firms are heterogeneous over productivity, comparative advantage can be 
based on international differences in the distribution of productivity. 
In this paper, comparative advantage between countries is based on differences in risk 
perception. Even though there are both optimistic and pessimistic managers in both countries, 
it seems reasonable to assume that one country may be overall more pessimistic than the 
other. Along these lines, Hofstede (2001) emphasizes that countries are heterogeneous with 
respect to uncertainty-avoidance2. The relatively more optimistic country will then export the 
risky commodity and import the certain commodity.  
The key assumptions of our paper, distortion of probabilities and manager heterogeneity, have 
direct consequences on the gains from trade debate. On the one hand, when managers distort 
probabilities, contrary to the case of traditional expected utility theory, two welfare criteria are 
needed. As shown by Hammond (1981), welfare has to be measured both before (ex-ante 
welfare) and after (ex-post welfare) the resolution of uncertainty, as ex-ante efficiency loses 
its normative appeal and ex-post efficiency becomes interesting. In addition, ex-post-ex-ante 
consistency is no longer ensured when managers are heterogeneous regarding their subjective 
probabilities3. We thus reconsider the gains from trade debate from the ex-ante point of view, 
as in previous international trade literature, but also from the ex-post point of view. This 
methodology challenges traditional perceptions of trade policy since a country may regret a 
commitment to free trade or protectionism when political decisions are based on ex-ante 
welfare analysis. On the other hand, manager heterogeneity implies that there are both ex-ante 
winners and losers from free trade in each country. However, there does not always exist a 
                                                 
2
 For instance, the level of uncertainty-avoidance is twice as high in Japan as in the United States. 
3
 See Blackorby, Donaldson and Mongin (2004). 
 5 
feasible compensation scheme that could guarantee Pareto welfare improvement within 
countries, at least for the more pessimistic country. Hence, manager heterogeneity matters 
since ex-ante welfare never falls with trade openness when managers are identical within 
countries. Moreover, numerical simulations show that ex-ante and ex-post analysis can lead to 
opposing policy recommendations for some parameter values.  A country may be better off 
ex-ante but worse off ex-post and vice versa. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the 
model, and Section 3 analyses the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 considers the free trade 
equilibrium, and Section 5 analyses the effect of free trade on ex-ante welfare. Section 6 
provides the ex-post welfare analysis and economic policy implications. Section 7 concludes. 
Section 2. The model 
Consider a country J in which a continuum of managers, indexed on the interval [ ]1,0 , 
choose one of two production projects C and R. Project C is certain and provides one unit of 
commodity C and a wage cw . Project R is risky, providing one unit of commodity R and a 
wage rw  with probability θ, and 0 with probability 1-θ. Risk is idiosyncratic to each 
manager’s project rather than global. Hence, aggregate uncertainty is cancelled by application 
of the law of large numbers4.  
2.1. The psychology of managers 
INSERT FIGURE 1. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the cognitive process and the choice process can affect the actual 
end probability. First, a manager may have difficulty in evaluating the actual risk due to 
                                                 
4
 As proved by Judd (1985), there are some difficulties with the application of the law of large numbers in a 
continuum. However, we follow here the tradition of the economic literature which explicitly or implicitly 
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cognitive problems. When the perceived probability is higher than the objective probability 
( θ>θˆ ) a manager is optimistic about the chances of success (conversely for a pessimistic 
manager). Strictly speaking, this optimism or pessimism is not psychological but cognitive: 
better information would lead the manager to revise the anticipated probability closer to θ. 
In this paper, there are neither information nor cognitive problems since we assume that each 
manager knows the objective probability of success (so that θ=θˆ ). We therefore focus on the 
choice process to shed some light on the psychology of managers faced with risk, in the spirit 
of Yaari (1987). The psychology of managers is introduced into the choice process via a 
distortion function )ˆ(g θ . When the distortion function )ˆ(g θ  is concave (convex), a manager is 
optimistic (pessimistic). According to Yaari, pessimistic (optimistic) behaviour is 
synonymous with risk-aversion (seeking) in the Dual Theory.  
Consequently, each manager [ ]1,0i ∈  may think that his own chances of success, denoted by 
)i(gθ , are different from the common knowledge objective probability. As Cooper, Woo & 
Dunkerberg (1988) note, “the assessment by entrepreneurs of their own likelihood of success 
is dramatically detached from past macro statistics, from perceived prospects for peer 
businesses, and from characteristics typically associated with higher performing new firms.” 
This assessment is psychological, and relies on self-confidence and not on cognitive 
difficulties. This explains why distorted probabilities tend to persist, since people are reluctant 
to take into consideration ego-threatening information in order to maintain their self-esteem. 
This phenomenon is well known amongst psychologists (Ross and Anderson, 1982) and can 
also be rationally grounded (Carillo and Mariotti, 2000, Benabou and Tirole, 2002, and Van 
der Steen, 2004). Bayesian revision is thus irrelevant in this context. We consequently assume 
that managers do not revise their distorted probabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
avoids this difficulty. See the seminal contributions of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or Lucas and Prescott 
 7 
2.2 The decision rule 
As noted above, the Dual Theory of choice under risk developed by Yaari (1987) is a useful 
tool for translating managers’ perceived risk into production choices. This theory is dual to 
expected utility theory as the roles of wealth and probabilities are reversed: utility is linear in 
wealth but non-linear in probabilities. In expected utility theory, risk aversion is synonymous 
with diminishing marginal utility of wealth. On the contrary, in the Dual Theory attitudes 
towards wealth do not affect attitudes towards risk since they appear separately. The linearity 
of the utility function in wealth then allows us to sidestep wealth effects and focus on attitudes 
towards risk.  
Consider a gamble L with two outcomes valued at ( x , x ) with respective objective 
probabilities (θ,1−θ).   
Following Yaari, the utility function of manager i becomes: 
x)(gx)](g1[)L( iii θ+θ−=Ω , 
where )(gi θ denotes the processing function of probabilities of manager i. Note that )(gi θ  is 
monotonously increasing in θ with gi(0) = 0 and gi(1) = 1. Then a manager is optimistic 
(pessimistic) when )(gi θ  is concave (convex). 
In our model, each manager has to choose between a certain project and a risky project, which 
provides wage rw  with probability θ and 0 with probability 1-θ. With the distorted 
probability )(gi θ , the prospect of the risky project R for manager i is: 
riii w)(g0)](g1[)R( ×θ+×θ−=Ω . 
The Dual Theory of choice under risk implies that managers invest all of their time in the 
management of their one production project. The linearity of utility in wealth produces corner 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1974). 
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solutions in optimization problems: the Dual Theory predicts “plunging” rather than 
diversification between safe and risky projects. As Yaari notes (p.110), “Under the Dual 
Theory, the behavior of such an agent, can be described, so to speak, as waiting in the wings 
until the rate of return is high enough, and then going whole hog”. 
This “plunging” behavior is consistent with Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) who 
note that entrepreneurs show a dramatic lack of diversification and extreme dispersion in 
returns. Choice is thus exclusive and we have the following decision rule. 
Decision rule: A manager [ ]1,0i ∈  chooses the risky project if and only if: 
criii ww)(g)C()R( >×θ⇔Ω>Ω   (1)  
The level of entrepreneurship in the economy then depends on both the distribution function 
of the distorted probabilities and on the two wages.  
2.3. Modelling manager heterogeneity 
We assume managers are heterogeneous since they distort a probability θ  according to their 
idiosyncratic distortion function )(gi θ . Define )i(gθ  the value of the distorted probability of 
manager i for one given θ . Then managers can be ranked over the continuum [ ]1,0  
according to their distorted probability )i(gθ  and their degree of optimism )i(θδ , where 
θ=Ψ=δ
θ
θθ
)i(g)i()i( . As illustrated in figure 2a, the cross-section for a given θ  gives the 
distribution function of distorted probabilities )i(gθ  depicted in figure 2b. Then, we obtain 
θ=Ψ=δ
θ
θθ
)i(g)i()i(  the distribution of the degree of optimism of managers. 
INSERT FIGURES 2a AND 2b 
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Then, a manager i is optimistic if 1)i( >Ψθ . For convenience, we will drop the subscript θ. 
Ψ is strictly increasing and continuous on the interval [ ]1,0 . δ  (resp. δ ) refers to the degree 
of optimism of the most (least) optimistic manager: )0(Ψ=δ  and )1(Ψ=δ . 
For example, define the distribution function of distorted probabilities as follows: i)i(g +βθ=  
with 



θ
∈β 1,0 . As illustrated in Figure 2b, the population of managers can be broken down 
into two groups: optimistic managers and pessimistic managers. 
– managers are optimistic for [ [ θ>β−∈ )i(g,1,0i  and 1)i( >Ψ  
– managers are pessimistic for ] ] θ<β−∈ )i(g,1,1i  and 1)i( <Ψ  
– Manager V indexed by β−1  is confident since θ=β− )1(g  and 1)1( =β−Ψ  
Section 3. Autarky 
General autarky equilibrium is reached when the risky commodity market clears. At the 
equilibrium price, the amount of risky commodity demanded by all agents equals the amount 
supplied (ex-post) by managers who have chosen (ex-ante) the risky process. Since decisions 
are made before the resolution of uncertainty, managers have to anticipate the level of 
earnings associated with each production project. This is possible as long as the distribution 
function of managers over distorted probabilities is common knowledge.  
3.1. The level of entrepreneurship 
The level of entrepreneurship in autarky is given by an , which is the share of managers 
involved in the risky project. The manager with index an  is indifferent between project R and 
project C. For this marginal manager, the decision rule states that  w)n(gw aRaaC ×= , that is: 
R
Caa
w
w)n(
θ
=Ψ=δ            (2) 
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The degree of optimism aδ  associated with this manager is equal to the objective relative 
wage. The level of entrepreneurship in autarky then equals an  as more optimistic managers 
will choose the risky project: 
[ ] )C()R(   and  )i(  , n,0i iiaa Ω>Ωδ≥Ψ∈∀ .      (3) 
Production of commodity R in autarky is then aaR ny θ= . 
3.2. Autarky equilibrium. 
Formally, as in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), the autarky equilibrium is characterised by a 
price p for which global supply of the risky commodity is equal to global demand and a 
marginal manager who is indifferent between the two activities. 
The following equations characterise the autarky equilibrium: 
a
a
p
1)n(
θ
=Ψ            (4) 
a
a
a
n
n1
)b1(
bp −×
θ×−
=          (5) 
Commodity C is the numéraire so that aJp  refers to the autarky price of commodity R in 
terms of commodity C. After the resolution of uncertainty, managers involved in the certain 
activity receive 1waC =  while lucky entrepreneurs earn aaR pw = . Substituting these 
expressions into (2) yields equation (4) which embodies the psychological side of the model.  
Let Cd  and Rd  be the demands for commodities C and R respectively. The aggregate 
demand functions for the two commodities have unitary price and income elasticities, and b 
denotes the share of income devoted to the consumption of commodity R. We then have 
y)b1(dC −=  and pbydR = , where y is aggregate income with aaaa np)n1(y θ+−= . The 
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relative price of commodity R which equalises global demand and global supply of 
commodity R is given by equation (5). 
From (4) and (5), the level of entrepreneurship in autarky is given by )n()n( aa φ=Ψ  where 
a
a
a
n1
n
b
b1)n(
−
×
−
=φ .  
Proof of the existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium level is provided in Appendix A, but 
a diagram may help to illustrate the properties of the autarky equilibrium. 
3.3. Diagrammatic presentation 
Figure 3 shows how the functions )n( aΨ  and )n( aφ  determine the equilibrium allocation of 
managers in industry R. The autarky level of entrepreneurship an  (i.e. the ranking of the 
marginal manager) is at point aE  where ΨΨ  and φφ  intersect. When all managers are 
confident, like manager V, the line ΨΨ is horizontal and the equilibrium level of 
entrepreneurship is equal to the share of the national income devoted to the consumption of 
the risky commodity: bna = . This benchmark helps to characterize the overall psychology of 
a country. 
Definition 1.  A country J is globally optimistic if the marginal manager is optimistic ( 1aJ >δ ). 
In other words, a country is optimistic if the equilibrium level of entrepreneurship is higher 
than b. Otherwise country J is globally pessimistic. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
Figure 3 shows the case of a globally pessimistic economy since the production of the risky 
commodity is less than b. The production choice of the confident manager reveals the attitude 
towards risk in the country. Here, the confident manager chooses the risky project as the 
remuneration of the risky commodity is higher than the relative expected productivities.  
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Section 4. International Trade 
Consider two countries O and P. The model assumes that the only difference between 
countries is that in managers’ psychological structure. Country O is relatively more optimistic 
than country P:  
] [ )n()n(,1,0n PO Ψ>Ψ∈∀          (6) 
A given entrepreneur n ranked in the continuum ] [1,0  is always more optimistic in country O 
than in country P. 
4.1. The law of comparative advantage 
The law of comparative advantage holds and the difference in autarky prices determines the 
pattern of trade. Under autarky, the relative price in country is given by (4): 
a
J
a
J
1p
θδ
=            (7)  
INSERT FIGURE 4 
Since demand conditions are identical in both countries, comparative advantage depends only 
on international differences in managers’ psychology. This result is illustrated in Figure 4. 
With identical demand conditions, the upward sloping curve φφ  is the same in country O and 
country P. Thus, in equilibrium, the level of entrepreneurship is higher in country O than in 
country P. Therefore, from (6) and (7), the relatively more optimistic country has a 
comparative advantage in the risky commodity: 
a
P
a
O
a
P
a
O pp <⇔δ>δ .          (8) 
 13 
Proposition 1. Country O has a comparative advantage in the production of the risky 
commodity since the marginal manager is, under autarky, relatively more optimistic in 
country O than in country P. 
4.2. Free Trade Equilibrium 
We assume that each manager knows the psychological structure in both countries. Then, 
each manager is able to compute the equilibrium price and wages resulting from the decision 
rule.  
World aggregate supply of commodity R is ( )θ+= *P*O*R nny . Moreover, world aggregate 
demand for commodity R is given by ( )
*
*P*O*R p
yybd +×=  with ( )*J*J**J n1npy −+θ= , j=O,P. 
At equilibrium, *R*R dy = . Therefore, 
.
nn
n1n1
)b1(
bp
*P*O
*P*O*
+
−+−
×
θ−
=         (9) 
As in autarky, the marginal manager is indifferent between C and R if the expected wages 
from each project are identical. Thus, from (3), (4) and (9), it follows that the degree of 
optimism of the marginal manager *δ  is: 
*
P
*
O
*
P
*
O*
n1n1
nn
b
b1
−+−
+
×
−
=δ          (10) 
The free-trade equilibrium exists and is unique (for the proof, see Appendix B). In each 
country, relatively optimistic managers with optimism greater than *δ  choose the risky 
project. By definition, for any degree of optimism *δ , the level of entrepreneurship is higher 
in O than in P. International trade will thus occur according to the law of comparative 
advantage. 
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Proposition 2. Under free trade, the relative price of the risky commodity lies between the 
autarky prices: aP*
a
O ppp ≤≤ . When demand conditions are identical, the relatively 
optimistic country will export the risky commodity while the pessimistic country will export 
the certain commodity. The proof is given in Appendix C. 
Section 5. Ex-ante welfare analysis 
The ex-ante analysis compares welfare under autarky to that under free trade, before the 
resolution of uncertainty. Ex-ante welfare depends on the expected income of managers, 
given their perception of risk. 
5.1. Methodology 
Given the demand functions depicted in section 3, the underlying expected utility function of 
manager i  before the resolution of uncertainty is: 
( ) bikb1bik py~E)b1(bV −−−=  ; C ,Rk =        (11) 
where ( )iky~E  is the expected income of manager i, which depends on production choice:  
( )



=θ
=
=
Rkforp)(g
Ckfor1
y~E
i
ik         (12) 
The effect of international trade on ex-ante welfare depends on the sign and the magnitude of 
the income effect (IE) and the price effect (PE). Converting from (11) the ratio of welfare 
under free trade to welfare under autarky into logarithmic form, the effect of free trade on ex-
ante welfare depends on the sign of: 
iJiJ
a
J
*a
iJ
*
iJ
a
iJ
*
iJ PEIE)ppln(b))y~(E)y~(Eln()VVln( +=−= .    (13) 
In each country, there are ex-ante winners and losers, depending on the production projects 
chosen under free trade and autarky. We can then examine the possibilities for compensation 
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within countries and between countries. Since ex-ante welfare is related to the psychology of 
each manager, an aggregation problem arises. We overcome this difficulty using the Hicksian 
compensation measure of welfare. This latter describes, for each manager, the lump-sum 
transfer required to produce under free trade the same level of utility as under autarky. Denote 
by Ti this Hicksian compensation. From (11), Ti is given by:  
( )[ ] ( ) baaikb*i*ik py~EpTy~E −− =+ .        (14) 
Country J is thus better off when the sum of these compensated incomes is negative:  
0diTT
1
0
iJ <= ∫ .          (15) 
5.2. Ex-ante winners and losers from free trade 
In both countries, free trade makes some managers better off and some others worse off (see 
Table 1). Let us consider the case of country O. In the more optimistic country, all managers 
are harmed by a negative price effect since the relative price of commodity R is increasing.  
Table 1. Ex-ante winners and losers from free trade 
 
Country O Country P 
Group I II III IV V VI 
Project choice: 
- autarky 
- free trade 
 
R 
R 
 
C 
R 
 
C 
C 
 
R 
R 
 
R 
C 
 
C 
C 
Population share aOn  aO*O nn −  *On1−  *Pn  *PaP nn −  aPn1−  
Income effect + + = - - = 
Price effect - - - + + + 
Ex-ante welfare Better off ? Worse off Worse off ? Better off 
Note: C and R denote the certain project and the risky project respectively. 
Three groups of managers can be identified according to their project choices under autarky 
and free trade. Managers who still produce commodity C (group III) must be worse off 
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because their income remains unchanged. On the contrary, free trade benefits autarky 
entrepreneurs (group I) because the positive income effect outweighs the negative price effect. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
The problem is more complicated for the occupation-switching managers (group II). Among 
those who change their occupation, there are both winners and losers depending on the 
strength of the income effect (see Figure 5). The ex-ante income effect, denoted by the dashed 
area in Figure 5, falls with managers’ pessimism. Only part of the relative price change feeds 
through to income; the other part, denoted by the dotted area, refers to the price increase 
necessary to make managers switch their occupation.  
Similarly, gainers (group VI) and losers (group IV) can be easily identified in country P while 
occupation-switching managers (group V) can be either winners or losers.  
5.3. Compensation schemes 
There are no analytic solutions to this problem as the equations are non-linear. Therefore, 
numerical simulations are required to evaluate the ability of winners to compensate losers (see 
Appendix E). Simulation 2 shows that policy redistribution sometimes fails in the more 
pessimistic country for some parameter values whereas it seems to be typically successful in 
the more optimistic country. This result is closely related to the assumption of heterogeneous 
managers. When managers are identical within each country, Blanchard and Peltrault (2004) 
show that free trade always improves ex-ante welfare because all managers in country P enjoy 
a positive price effect whereas the income effect is zero. 
Further, the more optimistic country can offset the fall in ex-ante welfare in the more 
pessimistic country: at least in all the specifications tested, there is a feasible compensation 
scheme between countries. The impact of free trade on ex-ante welfare is summarized in the 
following proposition.  
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Proposition 3. In both countries, there are winners and losers from the opening of trade. A 
feasible compensation scheme guaranteeing a Pareto welfare improvement within countries 
does not always exist, at least for the more pessimistic country. Ex-ante trade losses are due 
to manager heterogeneity in risk attitudes. 
Section 6. Ex-post welfare analysis and policy implications. 
The ex-post analysis compares autarky welfare to free trade welfare after the resolution of 
uncertainty. Whereas the ex-ante approach is more convenient at the individual level, ex-post 
analysis is best suited to the social level. This point of view is summarized by Blackorby, 
Donaldson and Mongin (2004, page 2): “as regard to rationality considerations, the ex-post 
approach makes a point of treating the managers and social entity alike, a crucial difference 
with the ex-ante approach”.  
6.1. The effect of free trade on ex-post welfare 
In autarky, the collective ex-post utility of country J is given by: 
( ) ( ) baaJbb1aJ pybb1U −− ×××−= . 
From (5) and (7), we have: 
( ) ( )
a
J
ba
Jbbb1a
J bb1
bb1U
δ+−
δ
×θ××−= − . 
Aggregate utility in country J depends on both the psychological structure of the population 
and demand conditions. The first-best optimum is reached when the marginal manager is 
confident i.e. when 1aJ =δ . In that case, the number of entrepreneurs is bn a = . The 
entrepreneurship deficit or surplus can then be defined as follows. 
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Definition 2. In autarky, the gap between the actual and the optimal number of entrepreneurs 
is bnD a −= . The economy faces an entrepreneurial deficit if D < 0 and an entrepreneurial 
surplus if D > 0. 
Simulation results 
First, at least one country benefits from the opening of trade (see Appendix D). Country O (P) 
is always better off if the world economy is globally pessimistic (optimistic). Hence, a 
confident country under autarky always benefits from trade. Numerical simulations (see 
Appendix E) are required for the further conclusions reported in Table 2.  
Table 2. The impact of free trade on ex-post welfare. 
 Country O Country P World 
Optimistic world Better off / worse off Better off Better off / worse off 
Pessimistic world Better off Better off / worse off Better off/ worse off 
Simulation 3 shows that either country O or country P might end up worse off. Hicksian 
compensation is used to evaluate the ability of one country to offset the fall in welfare in the 
other. The world can be worse off whether the world is globally pessimistic (simulation 4) or 
optimistic (simulation 5). Hence, free trade can amplify the distortion of resource allocation 
associated with autarky. This is the case in simulation 5 where both countries suffer from 
entrepreneurship surplus in autarky ( aoδ  and aPδ  are greater than 1). Here, the worldwide 
entrepreneurship surplus is amplified by free trade since aPaO*P*O nnnn +>+ . The reverse 
case is illustrated by simulation 4, where free trade increases the worldwide entrepreneurship 
deficit. 
Proposition 4. The impact of free trade on ex-post welfare can be either positive or negative. 
When the world is globally pessimistic (optimistic) the welfare of the more optimistic 
(pessimistic) country increases but the welfare of the other country may fall. Moreover, the 
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gains from trade in one country do not necessarily outweigh the losses of the other. The world 
economy can end up worse off with trade. 
Economic interpretations 
When the world is globally optimistic, proposition 4 states that the ex-post welfare of country 
O may fall with free trade. The reason is that the relative price of commodity R is not high 
enough to reward the risk that entrepreneurs objectively face. In fact, *p  is lower than the 
equilibrium price without any distortions5. Therefore, entrepreneurs receive a negative 
Objective Risk Premium: 01pORP * <−θ= . With the opening of trade, these negative risk 
premia flow into country O, where the level of entrepreneurship increases6. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
The effect of free trade on ex-post welfare mainly depends on demand conditions and the 
psychological distance between countries. On the one hand, each country profits from greater 
demand for the commodity in which the country specializes. As illustrated in Figure 6, 
country O is better off when the demand for the commodity R is high enough (b>0.47). 
Conversely, country P is better off when the demand for commodity R is low (b<0.53). On 
the other hand, the impact of free trade on welfare also depends on the psychological distance 
between countries, defined by the two distributions of distorted probabilities. 
INSERT FIGURE 7 
Figure 7 provides an example of the effect of psychological distance on the gains from trade. 
A higher value of Zp means that country P becomes less optimistic and that the psychological 
distance with country O increases. When the psychological distance is low (Zp<2), the world 
                                                 
5
 When managers are confident, the equilibrium price of commodity R is equal to the ratio of expected 
productivities, that is θ= 1p . 
 
6
 When the world is globally pessimistic, risk premia are positive and flow out of the more pessimistic country. 
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degree of optimism is high which means the ORP remains negative. Country O is then worse 
off since free trade implies more entrepreneurs and more negative ORP. As the psychological 
distance increases, world optimism decreases and the ex-post welfare of country O increases. 
In the end, country O benefits from trade if the distance is high enough (Zp>2). A large 
psychological distance will make both countries better off as long as it helps to 
counterbalance each country’s distortion.  
6.2. Trade Policy Implications 
The whole problem of uncertainty is that decisions are made which may be later regretted. As 
illustrated in Figure 7, ex-ante and ex-post analysis lead to opposite policy recommendations 
for some values of the psychological distance Zp. At least for the specifications tested, 
country O is always willing to trade before the resolution of uncertainty. However, after the 
resolution of uncertainty country O is likely to regret this decision when the world is globally 
optimistic and the relative price of commodity R is not high enough to reward the risk. Once 
again, this is a matter of risk premia. Before the resolution of uncertainty, entrepreneurs in 
country O expect that the risky project will provide a positive Subjective Risk Premium with 
1p)(gSRP ii −θ= . But after the resolution of uncertainty entrepreneurs come down to earth 
and receive the negative objective risk premium. 
INSERT FIGURE 7 
Conversely, country P may be reluctant to trade with country O before the resolution of 
uncertainty. In Figure 7, the ex-ante welfare of country P falls with free trade when the 
psychological distance is smaller than 1.7. In this case, autarky is better than free trade before 
the resolution of uncertainty. Yet, country P should have chosen to trade since ex-post welfare 
is larger with the opening of trade. The reason is that some entrepreneurs under autarky don’t 
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want to give up their positive SRP with the opening of trade. They should, however, since the 
ORP is actually negative. 
Section 7. Conclusion 
This paper has considered the role of international differences in managers’ psychology in 
influencing trade and the welfare effects of free trade. Countries will export the commodity in 
which they have a comparative advantage: the more optimistic country exports the risky 
commodity whereas the more pessimistic country exports the certain commodity. When trade 
is driven by a psychological bias, it is shown that free trade is not always welfare improving 
and that ex-ante and ex-post analysis can lead to opposing policy recommendations.  
As reported by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2002), 10.5% of the adult 
population is involved in the creation and growth of start-up businesses in the United States. 
The rate of entrepreneurial activity is lower in the main trade partners of the United States: 
1.8% in Japan, 3.2% in France, 5.2% in Germany and 5.4% in the United Kingdom. 
According to the European Commission, Europe suffers from an entrepreneurship deficit in 
comparison with the US, which could damage long-term growth prospects in Europe. But the 
effect of free trade is unclear since ex-ante and ex-post welfare can lead to opposite 
conclusions. More pessimistic countries like Europeans could be worse off from the ex-ante 
perspective but better off from the ex-post perspective. 
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Appendices 
A. Existence and Uniqueness of the Autarky Equilibrium 
Under autarky, the degree of optimism of the marginal entrepreneur is: 
b
b1)(h
n1
n
b
b1
aa
a
a
a
−
=δ×δ⇔
−
×
−
=δ , 
with .1)(
1)(h
1
−
δΨ
=δ
−
          (16) 
The function )(h δ  is strictly increasing on ] [δδ,  as )(1 δΨ−  is a strictly decreasing function 
on ] [δδ, . Moreover, 0)(hlim =δ
δ→δ
 and +∞=δ
δ→δ
)(hlim .  
Hence 0)(hlim =δ×δ
δ→δ
 and +∞=δ×δ
δ→δ
)(hlim  and there exists an unique ] [δδ∈δ ,a  such 
that 
b
b1)(h aa −=δ×δ .  The autarky equilibrium always exists and it is unique.                 ■ 
B. Existence and Uniqueness of the Free Trade Equilibrium 
Under free trade, the degree of optimism of the marginal entrepreneur δ* is: 
b
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The function )(f δ  is strictly increasing on ] [OP ,δδ  since )(1J δΨ −  is a strictly decreasing 
function in δ. Also, 0)(flim
p
=δ
δ→δ
and +∞=δ
δ→δ
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o
.  
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Hence 0)(flim
p
=δ×δ
δ→δ
 and +∞=δ×δ
δ→δ
)(flim
o
 and there exists a unique  ] [OP* ,δδ∈δ  
such that 
b
b1)(f −=δ×δ . The free trade equilibrium exists and it is unique.        ■ 
C. Specialization under Free Trade  
We demonstrate that the relative price under free trade is between the two autarky prices: 
a
O
*a
P
a
P
*a
O ppp δ<δ<δ⇔<< . 
As country O is globally more optimistic than country P, we have 
] [ )n()n(,1,0n PO Ψ>Ψ∈∀  
Therefore, from (16) and (17), it follows that )(h)(f)(h OP δ>δ>δ . 
For *δ=δ ,  we have **)(h**)(f**)(h OP δ×δ>δ×δ>δ×δ   
and **)(h
b
b1
**)(h OP δ×δ>
−
>δ×δ  
So aP
a
PPP )(h**)(h δ×δ>δ×δ  and **)(h)(h OaOaOO δ×δ>δ×δ . 
Since δ×δ)(h j  is a strictly increasing function in δ, then we have .* aOaP δ<δ<δ  Thus, 
country O and country P produce respectively more of the risky commodity and the certain 
commodity than under autarky.                            ■ 
D. One Country is always better off with trade after the resolution of uncertainty. 
Under autarky, the equilibrium level of consumption is ajaRj nd θ=    and   )n1(d ajaCj −= . 
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Let 'jy  denote the national income required to maintain this level of consumption under free 
trade.  Since ,1p
*
*
δθ
=  we have )n1(n1y ajaj*'j −+×δ= . 
When trade opens, the income of country J is ).n1(n1y *j*j**j −+×δ=  
Clearly, country J is better off ex-post under free trade if *jy  is higher than 'jy : 
( ) .0nn11yy aj*j*'j*j >−× −δ⇔>  
Whatever the degree of world optimism, country O produces more of commodity R under 
free trade than under autarky ( aO*O nn > ). The reverse holds for country P ( aP*P nn < ). 
Thus, 1yy *'O*O <δ⇔>  and 1yy *'P*P >δ⇔> . Therefore, one country is always better off 
with trade after the resolution of uncertainty. When the world economy is globally pessimistic 
(optimistic), country O (country P) is always better off.             ■ 
Note that a globally confident country under autarky ( 1aj =δ ) always benefits from the 
opening of trade. When the other country is optimistic (pessimistic), the confident country is 
indexed by P (O) and the world economy is globally optimistic (pessimistic).  
E. Simulation results 
Ex-ante analysis 
Simulation 1: country O and P are better off  
The psychological structure of managers is n13.0O )n( +−θ=Ψ    and   nP n 213.0)( +−=Ψ θ . 
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With b = 0.51 and θ = 0.45, we have 13.1=aOδ , 832.0=aPδ  and 0117.1* =δ . The sum of 
the compensated incomes are 0223.0diTT
1
0
iOO −== ∫  and 0052.0diTT
1
0
iPP −== ∫ . Therefore 
country O and country P are ex-ante better off with trade. Moreover, the world is better off 
since ∑ −=
j
W 0275.0T .  
Simulation 2: country P is worse off 
The psychological structure of managers is nO n
+−
=Ψ 13.0)( θ    and   nP n 4.113.0)( +−=Ψ θ . 
With b = 0.51 and θ = 0.45, we have 13.1=aOδ , 99.0=aPδ  and 069.1* =δ . The 
compensated incomes are 0086.0TO −=  and 0028.0TP = . Therefore, country O is better off 
with trade whereas country P is worse off. Moreover, the world is better off since 
∑ −=
j
W 0058.0T . 
Ex-post analysis 
Simulation 3: country O or country P might be worse off. 
The psychological structure of the managers in countries O and P are respectively: 
n
O n
+−
=Ψ 13.0)( θ    and   nP n +−=Ψ 17.0)( θ  
For all simulated values of the parameters b and θ the world is always better off ( 0Tw < ). 
When the world is globally optimistic ( 1* >δ ), country P is always better off with trade. 
Country O can be either worse off or better off with trade depending on the parameter values. 
– with b = 0.35 and θ = 0.45, we have 26.1=aOδ , 96.0=aPδ , 022.1* =δ .  The impact 
of free trade on ex-post welfare is 0055.0UO −=∆  and 0072.0UP =∆ . 
 28 
– with b = 0.43 and θ = 0.001, we obtain 12.2=aOδ , 68.0=aPδ  and 2.1* =δ . The 
impact of free trade on ex-post welfare is 0002.0UO =∆  and 0005.0UP =∆ . 
When the world is globally pessimistic ( 1* <δ ), country O is always better off while country 
P can be either worse off or better off according to the parameter values: 
– with b = 0.66 and θ = 0.45, we have 02.1=aOδ , 78.0=aPδ  and 89.0* =δ . The 
impact of free trade on ex-post welfare is 0065.0UO =∆  and 0052.0UP −=∆ . 
– with b = 0.51 and θ = 0.45, we obtain 13.1=aOδ , 87.0=aPδ  and 99.0* =δ . The 
impact of free trade on ex-post welfare is 00115.0UO =∆  and 00035.0UP =∆ .  
Simulation 4: A globally pessimistic world might be worse off. 
The psychological structure of the managers in countries O and P are respectively: 
n
O n
+−
=Ψ 15.0)( θ    and   1.015.0)( nP n +−=Ψ θ  
For some values of parameters, the world is globally pessimistic and is worse off with trade. 
With b = 0.66 and θ = 0.45 we obtain 89.0=aOδ , 67.0=aPδ  and 73.0* =δ . The impact of 
free trade on ex-post welfare is 0239.0UO =∆ , 0257.0UP −=∆  and 0071.0Tw = . Note that 
the aggregate number of entrepreneurs falls: 18.122.1 ** =+>=+ PO
a
P
a
O nnnn . 
Simulation 5: A globally optimistic world might be worse off. 
The psychological structure of the managers in countries O and P are respectively: 
n13.0O )n( +−θ=Ψ    and   nP n 313.0)( +−=Ψ θ  
For some values of parameters, the world is globally optimistic and is worse off with trade. 
With b = 0.2 and θ = 0.45 we obtain 42.1=aOδ , 06.1=aPδ  and 3.1* =δ . The impact of free 
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trade on ex-post welfare is 0132.0UO −=∆ , 0127.0UP =∆  and 001.0Tw = . The aggregate 
number of entrepreneurs rises: 4915.04711.0 ** =+<=+ POaPaO nnnn .  
 
Figure 1. From actual risk to choice 
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Figure 2a.    Figure 2b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
ψθ(i) 
v 0    1 
  gθ(i) 
 δ
δ 
 k 
ψθ(j) 
gθ(0) 
gθ(j) 
gθ(1) 
gθ(k) 
θ=θ )v(g  
j 
ψθ(k) 
     1 
 1 
  gi(θ) 
     0 
     θ 
g0(θ) 
g1(θ) 
gj(θ) 
gk(θ) 
θ=θ)(g v  
 31 
 
Figure 3. Autarky equilibrium 
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Figure 4. Comparative advantages 
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Figure 5. The ex-ante income effect in the optimistic country 
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Figure 6. Demand conditions and ex-post gains from trade 
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Note: the distribution functions of distorted probabilities are n17.0O )n( +−θ=Ψ  and n13.0P )n( +−θ=Ψ , 
with 45.0=θ . 
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Figure 7. The psychological distance between countries and the gains from trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note: The ex-ante and ex-post gains from trade are given for both countries along the y-axis.  Zp is an 
indicator of the psychological distance along the x-axis. The distribution functions are 
n13.0
O )n( +−θ=Ψ and nZp13.0P )n( ×+−θ=Ψ  with 45.0=θ , and demand conditions are given by 
51.0b = . When Zp is greater than 1, country O and country P export the commodity in which they 
enjoy comparative advantage. 
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